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EVIDENCE-FEDERAL CruMINAL PROCEDURE-ADMISSIBILITY oF CoNFEss10N
OBTAINED DuruNG ILLEGAL DETENTION-Petitioner was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of larceny. He was held without commitment for a period of
thirty hou~ during which he was intermittently questioned but was not subjected
to any form of physical coercion. At the end of this period, he signed a confession
which was the basis for his conviction in the district court. On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, following affirmation in the court of appeals,1 held,
reversed. The detention was unlawful as a violation of rule 5 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 and the confession thus obtained was inadmissible
in evidence. Upshaw v. United States, (U.S. 1948) 69 S.Ct. 170.
For thirty-five years the federal courts have made an exception to the common
law rule that admissibility of evidence does not depend on the manner in wbich it
was obtained. 3 Thus it seems well accepted that evidence will not be received in a
federal court which has been obtained through unlawful search and seizure,4 by
means of wire-tapping, 5 or in deprivation of due process.6 Though much-condemned as an unjustified effort to regulate the police7 and as a case of "misplaced

Upshaw v. United States (App. D.C. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 167.
18 U.S.C. following §687 (Rules of Criminal Procedure) rule 5 (a) (1946); "An·
officer making an arrest . • • shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay • • ."
before the nearest available committing magistrate.
a 8 WmMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2183 (1940).
4 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); cf. Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098 (1947). It should be noted that the prohibitions considered here and in note 5, infra, apply only when the actfon was by federal officials.
5 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939); Weiss v. United States,
308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269 (1939).
6 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944). This prohibition applies to actions either by state or
federal goveIIlJllent officers.
7 Hamo, "Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure," 19 ILL. L. REV. 303
(1925); Waite, "Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons," 31 MrcH. L. REV. 749 (1933).
1
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sentimentality,"8 the doctrine was extended in McNabb v. United States9 to deny
admission of a confession obtained during a detention unlawful under rule 5 (a).
The wisdom of such a policy, which is based expressly on the legislative mandate
rather than the Constitution, 10 has been much debated. 11 Critics of the McNabb
case were encouraged by a later Supreme Court holding in United States v. Mitchell, 12 where a confession was admitted although there was a subsequent unlawful detention. Language in that opinion indicated that the real inquiry was still,
as at common law, 13 whether the confession was trustworthy. 14 It is submitted
that any such explanation of the Mitchell case is dissipated by the instant case, and
that the full force of the McNabb rule is reasserted. The qualification of the Mitchell case seems to do no more than limit the ban to evidence which was "the fruit of
the poisonous tree," a concept already developed in the wire-tapping15 and unlawful search10 situations. From the standpoint of stare decisis, the holding seems unimpeachable; but, as indicated above, from the standpoint of policy, there is more
room for doubt. The decision reiterates that this is not a constitutional point,
so it would seem that policy can best be served by a legislative enactment. However, at least one state court has followed the rule without benefit of statute,1 7 and
the trend of federal decisions leaves a strong possibility that very nearly the same
result can be reached on the basis of due process. 18 If the matter is to be governed
more explicitly by statute, there appears to be much value in the English system
providing comprehensive rules for interrogation of prisoners. 19

William F. Snyder, S. Ed.
8 8 WrcMonE, EVIDENCE, 3d
O 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608

ed., §2184 (1940).
(1943); see also the companion case, Anderson v. United
States, 318 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 599 (1943). Based on a federal statute, this limitation is
applied only to federal arrest.
I0l\IcNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 at 341, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943): "Quite apart
from the Constitution, therefore, we are constrained to hold that the evidence elicited from
the petitioners in the circumstances disclosed here must be excluded."
11 See the Judiciary Committee Hearings on H.R. 3690, 78th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1-142
(1943). For discussions opposing the rule, see Inbau, "The Confession Dilemma in the
United States Supreme Court," 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948); 42 MmH. L. REV, 679 (1944).
For favorable comment see McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions," 24 TEx. L. REv. 239 (1946); 28 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1943); 22 TEx.
L. REV. 473 (1944).
12 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896 (1944). For the effect of this decision in the lower federal
courts, cf. United States v. Bayer, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 156 F. (2d) 964 with Brinegar v.
United States, (C.C.A. 10th, 1947) 165 F. (2d) 512.
l3 McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions,"
24 TEX. L. REV. 239 (1946); 94 A.L.R. 1036 (1935).
14 322 U.S. 65 at 70, 71, 64 S.Ct. 896 (1944). See 47 CoL. L. REv. 1214 (1947).
15 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939).
lG Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause," 29
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1930).
1 7State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15 N.W. (2d) 585 (1944).
18 Many cases have denied admission of confessions for deprivation of due process on
very meager showings that anything further than detention was in_volved. Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S 596, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948) (tender years); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct.
921 (1944) (lack of rest); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945)
(psychological fears).
19 For a discussion of "Judge's Rules" in England, see 6 POLICE JouRNAL 342, 353
(1933).

